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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
Case No.

v.

:

PENNY JO WALLACE

:

Defendant/Appellant.

950772-CA

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a conviction of unlawful possession
of a controlled substance, marijuana, with intent to distribute
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1994), a third degree
felony; unlawful possession of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine, with intent to distribute, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1994), a second degree felony; and
possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37a-5(l) (1994).

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (1994) .
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Is a valid warrantless inventory search of an automobile

rendered invalid because the officer also had probable cause to
search the automobile for contraband?

2.

Alternatively, did exigent circumstances exist thereby

justifying the warrantless search of defendant's automobile?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's factual findings underlying its
decision to deny a motion to suppress are reviewed under a
clearly erroneous standard.

State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 854

(Utah 1992) . Factual findings are clearly erroneous only if the
trial court's factual findings are not adequately supported by
the record, "resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light
most favorable to the trial court's determination."
Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).

State v.

A trial court's legal

conclusions based on its factual findings, are reviewed for
correctness, being afforded no deference.

Pena. 869 P.2d at 939;

Brown, 853 P.2d at 855.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES/ AND RULES
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2

Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 14
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or thing to be seized.
STATEMENT OP THE CASE
Defendant, Penny Jo Wallace, was charged in an information
with two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378 (1994), second and third degree felonies; one count of
possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
58-37a-5(a) (1994), a class B misdemeanor; one count of failure to
affix a drug stamp, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-105
(1992), a third degree felony; one count of operating or being in
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of
alcohol and/or drugs in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44
(1993 & Supp. 1995) , a class A misdemeanor; and one count of
unsafe lane travel in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-69
(1993), a class C misdemeanor (R. 01-03).

3

Defendant moved to suppress all evidence discovered as the
result of a warrantless search of her automobile by a police
officer (R. 33).

After hearing brief testimony from the police

officer, the parties stipulated to the facts as set forth in
their respective memoranda and as set forth in the police
officer's written incident report (T. 4-5, 33). Upon hearing
argument from all the parties, the trial court found and
concluded that the search was a valid inventory search and that
it was conducted pursuant to policy (T. 33-34) . The trial court
also found that the vehicle had been left in the officer's
custody and possession and that he had an obligation and duty to
conduct the inventory search (T. 33-34) . The trial court
therefore denied defendant's motion to suppress (T. 33-34).
After a trial on August 23, 1995, a jury convicted defendant
of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute, marijuana, a third degree felony; unlawful possession
of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to
distribute, a second degree felony; possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor; and unsafe lane travel, a
class C misdemeanor (R. 110-111).
On October 5, 1995, defendant was sentenced to two prison
terms for the possession convictions, one not to exceed five
4

years and the other from one-to-fifteen years (R. 143-46).
Defendant was also ordered to pay $27#750.00 in fines and
surcharges for the possession convictions (R. 143-46).

For the

possession of drug paraphernalia conviction, defendant was

I
sentenced to serve not more than six months in the county jail
and to pay a $1,850.00 fine and surcharge (R. 143-46).

Defendant

was sentenced to no more than 90 days in the county jail and to
pay $1,387.50 in fines and surcharges for the unsafe lane
conviction (R. 143-46).

All sentences were ordered to run

concurrently, however, the sentences were stayed and defendant
was placed on probation (R. 143-46).
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from the two
convictions for possession of a controlled substance with intent
to distribute and from the conviction for possession of drug
paraphernalia (R. 148).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 17, 1995, defendant, Penny Jo Wallace, as driver,
and her co-defendant, Roland H. Wheeler, as passenger, were
involved in a one vehicle accident on SR-3 0 (R. 89). Trooper
Arlow Hancock of the Utah Highway Patrol responded to the scene
of the accident and found defendant wrapped in a blanket and
sitting on the ground near her car (R. 89). Wheeler, also
5

wrapped in a blanket, reported to the trooper that he was in pain
(R. 89). Trooper Hancock assured defendant and Wheeler that an
ambulance was on its way (R. 89).
After requesting that a witness to the accident provide a
written statement, Trooper Hancock asked defendant for a driver's
license, registration, and proof of insurance (R. 90). Defendant
told the trooper that the requested documents were in her car (R.
90).

Trooper Hancock attempted to retrieve the documents from

the car, but found the car doors locked, the engine running, and
the keys in the ignition (R. 90). The officer informed defendant
of this and Wheeler provided the trooper with a set of keys to
the car (R. 90). Defendant then told the officer that her
driver's license was in a brown wallet in her purse and that her
purse was between the seats (R. 90).
Trooper Hancock returned to the car, unlocked the door, and
retrieved defendant's purse (R.. 90). He took the purse to
defendant and opened it in front of her (R. 90). Defendant
repeated that her license was in her brown wallet and the officer
took the wallet out of the purse and opened it to find
defendant's Utah driver's license (R. 90). Trooper Hancock asked
if defendant had a registration and proof of insurance, to which
defendant replied, "It's in the glove box, you should be able to
6

find it" (R. 90).
The officer again returned to the car to look for the
registration and proof of insurance (R. 90). Trooper Hancock
entered the car through the passenger front door and opened the
glove compartment (R. 90). At this time, the trooper smelled
what he believed to be burnt marijuana (R. 90). While the
officer was looking for a registration and proof of insurance,
defendant and Wheeler were transported by ambulance to the Logan
Regional Hospital (R. 90).
Trooper Hancock then returned to his patrol car and
completed an accident report form (R. 90). Trooper Hancock
requested that Trooper Kendrick, who had arrived earlier,
complete a field diagram of the accident (R. 90).
Before leaving in the ambulance, defendant asked that the
police call a towing company from Honeyville in Box Elder County
(R. 90). The officers complied with that request, and a private
tow truck was en route to the accident scene (R. 90-91).

After

completing the accident report, Trooper Hancock asked Trooper
Kendrick to assist him in completing an inventory of the contents
of defendant's car so that the car "could be released to the
wrecker" (R. 90-91).

7

While Trooper Kendrick obtained an inventory form, Trooper
Hancock once again entered defendant's car through the front
passenger car and again smelled burnt marijuana (R. 91). Trooper
Hancock opened a small wooden box on the floor in front of the
seat (R. 91). The box contained a marijuana pipe, fine screen
material, and rolling papers (R. 91).
Trooper Hancock told Trooper Kendrick of his discovery and
then requested dispatch to send an officer to the hospital to
arrest defendant for driving under the influence of drugs and to
obtain a blood test on defendant (R. 91). Trooper Hancock also
asked that Wheeler be arrested (R. 91) .
The officers decided to start their inventory at the trunk
so as to complete the inventory in an orderly fashion (R. 91).
In the trunk, the officers discovered a white plastic bottle with
a metal tube in the side (R. 91). It had residue in it and
appeared to be a marijuana pipe (R. 91). The trunk contained
other drug paraphernalia such as syringes, pipes, glass and metal
spoons, and a butane torch (R. 91). Located in the same box as
the marijuana pipe was a chart of measurements and street terms
for drugs (R. 91). The trunk also held a basket of men's
clothing in which the officers found approximately fourteen
baggies of marijuana (R. 91). There were also metal containers
8

containing numerous paper bindles, which contained a white powder
believed to be cocaine or methamphetamine (R. 91).
Trooper Hancock then called for a supervisor who witnessed
the rest of the inventory (R. 91-92).

After completing the

inventory of items in the trunk, the officers moved to the
interior of the car where they found papers containing a white
powder that appeared to be cocaine, and several pornographic
magazines from which the paper bindles appeared to be cut (R.
92).

The officers also found various other personal items and

effects in the car (R. 64).
The officers canceled the wrecker from Honeyville and called
another company to tow the car for a State Impound (R. 92). The
car was removed from the scene upon completion of the inventory
and the wrecker driver was asked to keep the car in a secured
area because of all the personal effects inside (R. 92). In
completing the inventory, the officers followed written
procedures of the Utah Highway Patrol (T. 10-12) and they
completed a vehicle inventory form listing all the items, both
legal and illegal, found in the car (R. 64) .
Defendant complied with a request to take a blood test and
was found to be under the influence of drugs (R. 92). Both
defendant and Wheeler were then booked into the Cache County Jail
9

on charges of possession of illegal drugs (R. 92).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to

suppress because the evidence in question was discovered pursuant
to a valid inventory search.

Before the trial court, defendant

affirmatively waived her argument that the inventory search was
not justified under the circumstances.

Even if defendant did not

waive her argument, the warrantless search was valid because it
met the criteria of a valid inventory search: 1) it was justified
under the circumstances and 2) the officers followed standardized
written policy in conducting the inventory.

The fact that the

officer had probable cause to search the car did not in and of
itself make the otherwise valid inventory search a mere pretext
for an illegal warrantless search.

This Court should reject a

"pretext" analysis in inventory search cases and rely only on
objective criteria in determining whether a warrantless inventory
search is valid.
2.

The officer could also legally search defendant's car

because he had probable cause to believe that there was
contraband in the car and exigent circumstances existed at the
time the search was performed.

Defendant concedes that the

officer had probable cause to search the car.
10

Exigent

circumstances existed at the time of the search because a private
tow truck was on its way to remove the car from the control of
the police officers.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS DISCOVERED PURSUANT TO A
VALID INVENTORY SEARCH
Defendant first challenges the trial court's denial of her
motion to suppress on the ground that the trial court incorrectly
ruled that the search was a valid inventory search conducted
pursuant to Utah Highway Patrol [UHP] policy and procedure.
Defendant essentially argues that the inventory search was
invalid because 1) the inventory search was not authorized by
statute or justified by the circumstances surrounding the initial
stop as required in State v. Hygh. 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985),
(Brief of Appellee [Br, App.] at 7, 9, 11), and 2) the police
officer had probable cause to search her car, thereby rendering
the inventory search invalid as a mere pretext to illegally
search the car without a warrant (Id. at 11-12)•1

defendant's basic argument is that "the warrantless search of
defendant's vehicle was an investigatory search for which a
warrant was required and that the officer's failure to obtain a
warrant prior to conducting a search of defendant's vehicle
11

It is well established that an inventory search is an
exception to the warrant requirement of both the Utah and federal
constitutions.

South Dakota v. Opperman. 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct.

3092 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski. 413 U.S. 433, 445-47, 93 S. Ct.
2523, 2530-31 (1973); State v. Hygh. 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah
1985); State v. Gray. 851 P.2d 1217, 1220-21 (Utah App. 1993).

violated article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution." (Br.
App. at 6 ) . As a general rule, this Court will not engage in a
separate state constitutional analysis in the absence of an
argument for a different analysis under both the state and
federal constitutions. State v. Lafferty. 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.
5 (Utah 1988); State v. Ham. 910 P.2d 433, 438 n.6 (Utah 1996);
State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460, 462 n.l (Utah App. 1991). Although
defendant argues that article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution affords her more protection from illegal searches
than the Fourth Amendment, she provides no analysis or rationale
for that proposition. She cites to the plurality opinion in
State v. Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990), and to State v.
Naisbitt. 827 P.2d 969 (Utah App. 1992) to support her argument,
however, she does not explain why those cases require the result
she desires.
It is important to note that Larocco, which did not garner a
majority of the Court, does not apply to inventory searches.
State v. Gray. 851 P.2d 1217, 1222 (Utah App. 1993).
Furthermore, to date, the Utah Supreme Court has only employed
the same analysis as that used under the Fourth Amendment in
determining whether an inventory search is valid under the Utah
Constitution. State v. Hyah. 711 P.2d 264, 267-69 (Utah 1985);
see also State v. Gray. 851 P.2d 1217, 1221 (Utah App. 1993).
Because defendant has not proposed that her case should be
analyzed any differently under the Utah Consitution, she has
waived the right to have this Court apply a separate or different
state constitutional analysis. See Lafferty. 749 P.2d at 1247 n.
5; E&m, 910 P.2d at 438 n.6; State v. Carter. 812 P.2d at 462
n.l.
12

Both constitutions permit a warrantless search of a legitimately
impounded vehicle to 1) protect the private property of the owner
while the vehicle remains in police custody, 2) protect the
police from claims of theft, loss, or vandalism, and 3) detect
dangerous conditions or instrumentalities contained within the
vehicle.

State V, JghnSCT, 745 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1987); Hyah.

711 P.2d at 267; State v. Gray. 851 P.2d at 1221; State v.
Steraey, 808 P.2d 122, 125 (Utah App. 1991).
For a warrantless inventory search to be valid, there must
first be a reasonable and proper justification to impound the
vehicle.

Hyah. 711 P.2d at 268; Steraerr 808 P.2d at 124-25.

That justification may come either from explicit statutory
authority, Hyah. 711 P.2d at 268, or from the circumstances
surrounding the initial stop or impoundment, id.: State v.
JpfaigQn, 745 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1987); Steraer. 808 P.2d at 124.
Once it has been determined that proper justification exists for
the impoundment, the warrantless inventory is valid only if there
is a regular set of procedures in place to adequately guard
against arbitrariness and only if that procedure is followed in
making the inventory.

Hyah. 711 P.2d at 269; Steraer. 808 P.2d

at 125.
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Defendant does not argue that the inventory was not
conducted pursuant to or in conformance with a regular set of
procedures of the UHP.

She argues only that there was no

explicit statutory authority or other reasonable justification
for police to inventory her car.

iL Defendant jig preluded frcm challenging whether the
inventcry search was justified under the circumstances
because she affirmatively waived that point below.
Before the trial court, defendant abandoned the issue of
whether the inventory search was justified under the
circumstances.

In her memorandum in support of her motion to

suppress, defendant appears to have challenged the validity of
the inventory search on the ground that it had no statutory or
other legal basis.

However, at the suppression hearing,

defendant conceded that if Trooper Hancock had not smelled burnt
marijuana in the car, he could have legally conducted an
inventory search (T. 6-7). The following exchanges between the
trial court and defendant's counsel took place at the suppression
hearing:
COURT: What if Trooper Hancock had not noticed the odor of
marijuana, did not have any reasonable suspicion or probable
cause, . . . that there was some contraband in the vehicle;
but in fact was conducting an inventory search because the
vehicle had been essentially turned over to him to turn
over, again, to a towing company, since the driver and
passenger were transported, I believe, by ambulance to the
14

hospital. I believe those are the facts. He did have
possession of the vehicle, he did call a tow truck, it did
arrive and he conducted a search of the vehicle (T. 6-7).
Now, absent any notice of marijuana or contraband,
could he have conducted an inventory search of the vehicle
legally (T. 7)?
DEFENSE COUNSEL:

I think so (T. 7).

COURT: Was the marijuana, or the contraband allegedly
found, found in some manner inconsistent with an inventory
search (T. 11)?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: UQ. (T. 11).

COURT: It seems to me what you're saying is the officer may
legally conduct an inventory search unless he thinks there's
some criminality involved, and then he can't do it unless he
gets a warrant (T. 12)?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: You know, I think that's fairly close to
what I'm saying, yes (T. 12).
(Emphasis added.) (See attached Appendix A ) .
As evidenced by the foregoing, defendant acknowledged below
that but for Trooper Hancock's reporting that he had smelled
burnt marijuana, the inventory search was valid.

Having conceded

that point, defendant solicited the trial court to suppress the
evidence solely on the proposition that probable cause precludes
an inventory search from being valid, n<?t on the theory she
raises on appeal that there was no justification for the
15

inventory in the first place.

In other words, defendant

affirmatively waived the issue of whether there was a legal
justification for the inventory search.

She invited the trial

court to not even address that issue, and to base its decision
solely on whether the existence of probable cause made the
inventory search a mere pretext for conducting a warrantless
search, thereby invalidating the inventory.
Having made that argument below, and the trial court having
made its ruling based at least in part on defendant's concession,
defendant should be prohibited from arguing now that the
inventory itself was invalid.

See State v. Parsons. 781 P.2d

1275, 1285 (Utah 1989)(defendant not permitted to seek to vacate
sentence by alleging on appeal prejudicial error which he had
affirmatively, knowingly, and intentionally waived at sentencing hearing); State v. Medina. 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987)(court
would not review appropriateness of jury instruction where
defense counsel affirmatively stated at trial she had no
objection to that instruction).
B. The inventory search was justified under the
circumstances surrounding the search and the officers
followed an established reasonable procedure for conducting

the inventoryEven if defendant did not affirmatively waive her argument

16

that the inventory search had no legal basis, the warrantless
inventory search was still valid under the criteria set forth in
Hygh, 711 P.2d at 268, The defendant correctly states that there
is no express statutory authority that permits a police officer
to inventory the contents of a car left at the side of a highway
as the result an accident.

Therefore, the issue is whether the

circumstances of this case justified the inventory.
This case presents a somewhat unique fact scenario in that
unlike most warrantless inventory searches, the police had not
actually impounded defendant's car before beginning the inventory
search.

Rather, the police had been given possession and custody

of the car by the defendant while they awaited the arrival of a
tow truck, which police had called at defendant's request, to
remove the car to a private garage.

The police had been given

the keys to defendant's car and had entered the car twice at
defendant's request to search for her driver's license and
registration.
Even though defendant's car had not technically been
impounded when the inventory search was conducted, the same
policies that justify a warrantless inventory search of impounded
vehicles apply in these circumstances.
P.2d 122, 125 (Utah App. 1991).

See State v. Sterger. 808

Because the police received
17

custody of the car and its keys from defendant, and because the
defendant was unavailable to remove her car from the roadway, the
police were made responsible for the contents of the vehicle.
Thus, the police were potentially liable for claims of loss or
theft should any of the vehicle's contents be lost or destroyed.
This Court, in circumstances similar to those presented in
this case, upheld a warrantless inventory search as proper and
appropriate.

State v. Sterger. 808 P.2d 122 (Utah App. 1991).

In Sterger, the defendant was involved in a serious one car
accident in a remote area of southern Utah.
car to find help.
accident.

Defendant left his

A police officer arrived soon after the

The passengers, who were critically injured, were

transported to the nearest hospital. A tow truck then arrived to
remove the inoperative vehicle from the road.

As the car was

locked, the police officer used a "slim jim" to open one of the
car doors.

He then began to inventory the contents of the

defendant's car.

During the inventory, the officer found a green

leafy substance that appeared to be marijuana.

The police

officer had the vehicle towed to his home where he planned to
finish the inventory.

The day following the accident, the car

was towed to a state certified impound yard, where the inventory
was completed two days after the accident.
18

Id. at 123-24.

The defendant in Sterger argued that there was no need for
the police officer to take the car into custody, but that the car
could have simply been locked and left it where it was.
124.

Id. at

This Court disagreed and held that the surrounding

circumstances justified the police officer's inventory.

Id.

Specifically, the Court pointed to the fact that defendant's car
was partially blocking the road, the front windshield was
shattered, the car was inoperable, and all the occupants had been
taken away for medical attention.

Id.

The Court noted that

because the police were authorized under those circumstances to
take custody of the defendant's vehicle, "a concomitant right
existed to examine and inventory its contents."

Id. at 125.

In the instant case, although defendant's car was not
partially blocking the road, it was left off to the side of a
state road and created a potential nuisance.

There was no one to

remove the car because all its occupants had been transported to
the hospital for medical attention.

The record does not reflect

whether or not the car was inoperable, but a tow truck was
called, at defendant's request, to remove the car from the side
of the road.

In short, the police were left with the care and

custody of defendant's car and its contents.

19

In addition to these facts, and as defendant acknowledges in
her brief, UHP written policy clearly states that vehicles should
be towed or impounded n[w]hen removal is necessary in the
interest of public safety because of fire, flood, storm, snow or
other emergency reasons or for the safety of the vehicle and its
contents."

Utah Highway Patrol General Order No. 83-9, Revised

July 1991, p. 2 (emphasis added)(R. 75-82, see attached Appendix
B).

Defendant has not argued that her car or its contents should

have been left at the side of the road.

In fact, she requested

the officers to make arrangements for its removal.

The accident

and the subsequent removal of defendant and her passenger to the
hospital constituted an emergency and the safety of the car and
its contents necessitated its removal.
Under these circumstances, the police were justified in
following standard written procedure and taking possession of
defendant's car and completing an inventory of its contents to
protect defendant's possessions and to protect themselves from
any claims of theft or loss.

See Sterger. 808 P.2d at 124-26.

C. The mere presence of probable cause does not invalidate
an otherwise valid inventory.
Defendant's second argument is that because Trooper Hancock
had probable cause to search her car, the inventory search was no
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more than a pretext to conduct a warrantless search and as such
the inventory search was invalid.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that an inventory search of
an automobile is invalid when it is "merely 'a pretext concealing
an investigatory police motive.'"

State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264,

268 (Utah 1985)(quoting South Dakota v. Opperman. 428 U.S. 364,
376, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3100 (1976)); State v. Rice. 717 P.2d 695,
696 (Utah 1986)(per curiam).

In Hygh. the Utah Supreme Court

refused to uphold a warrantless inventory search on the ground
that the inventory was no more than a "pretext" for a warrantless
search.

711 P.2d at 270.

In conducting an inventory pursuant to

an impound, the police officer in Hygh did not use an inventory
sheet or make a list of the items found.

The officers in Hygh

did not follow any of their regular policies or procedures for
conducting an inventory.

It was clear from the facts in that

case that the officer had impounded the car simply so that he
could search the car for evidence that the defendant was involved
in a reported robbery.
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court in Rice, refused to uphold
an officer's inventory search which was obviously nothing more
than a sham to cover for a warrantless search.
97.

717 P.2d at 696-

The officers in Rice suspected the defendant of drug
21

dealing, but they had insufficient evidence to arrest him or to
obtain a search warrant.

Knowing that the defendant did not have

a driver's license, the police waited outside the defendant's
parents' home until the defendant got into his truck and drove
away.

The police signaled for the defendant to pull over and the

defendant pulled into an office parking lot, which was located
only a few blocks from his parents' home.

Police refused to let

the defendant leave his locked truck in the parking lot or to
call his parents to retrieve the truck.

Instead, the police

impounded the truck and conducted an inventory search at the
police station.

Id. at 696.

The officers in Rice had no written

standards or procedures for impoundment of the defendant's
vehicle and the State conceded the invalidity of the inventory
search on the ground that the officers had no reasonable basis
for impounding the defendant's vehicle.

Id.

Although the Utah Supreme Court has refused to uphold
inventory searches that are obviously no more than a pretext to
conduct an illegal search without a warrant, it has never held,
as defendant argues here, that an otherwise validly conducted
inventory search becomes invalid merely because the officer has
probable cause to search the vehicle.

In fact, in at least one

case, the Utah Supreme Court appears to have rejected that
22

proposition.

State v. Earl. 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986).

In Earl,

the defendant was arrested and his car was impounded at the
police station.

Prior to arresting the defendant, the arresting

officer smelled a strong odor of marijuana coming from the
interior of the car.

The police officers discussed the

possibility of obtaining a warrant to search the car, but learned
that both justices of the peace were out of town.

The officers

determined that they would be following correct UHP policy and
procedures if they conducted an inventory search.

Id. at 804.

The defendant argued that although the police officer had
probable cause to search the car at the time of the arrest, the
police could not search the car without a warrant after the
automobile was impounded.

Id. at 805. The Court summarily

rejected defendant's assertion that an inventory search under
such circumstances was pretextual in nature and that the
discovered evidence must be suppressed under the Fourth
Amendment.

Id.

The Utah Court of Appeals relied on Earl in upholding an
inventory search conducted after police tried unsuccessfully to
contact the county attorney to obtain a search warrant.
Gray. 851 P.2d 1217, 1221 (Utah App. 1993).

State v.

The officer in Gray,

like the officer in Eacl# had probable cause to search the car in
23

that he had observed property that was reported stolen in plain
view in the car that he had pulled over.

Id. at 1210. This

Court held that the fact that the officers had previously
attempted to secure a search warrant did not invalidate the
otherwise proper inventory search.

Id. at 1221.

See also State

v. Stricklincr. 844 P.2d 979, 987 (Utah App. 1992) (assuming, but
not deciding that even if pretext doctrine applied to inventory
search, the officer's subjective motivation in wanting to search
defendant's vehicle for evidence of a burglary was irrelevant).
The fundamental problem with a "pretext inventory search"
analysis as argued by defendant is that it focuses only on the
subjective intent of the police officer, while ignoring the true
issue of whether the inventory search is constitutionally
reasonable.
1994).

See State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1136-38 (Utah

Thus, under defendant's argument, an inventory search

that is legal in every way is rendered invalid simply because the
officer may have also had an ulterior motive to investigate a
crime he suspects has been committed.
The Utah Supreme Court has rejected the application of
"pretext analysis" to roadside detentions, Lopez. 873 P.2d at
1140, and to warrantless arrests, State v. Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196,
1204-06 (Utah 1995).

The Court reasoned in those cases that the
24

validity of a stop or an arrest must be analyzed on objective
criteria, and not on the subjective motivation or suspicions of a
police officer.

Harmon. 910 P.2d at 1206; Lopez. 873 P.2d at

1136-38.
There is no sound reason, policy or otherwise, for applying
a different analysis in inventory search cases.

Thus, the

primary focus of the court should be on whether the inventory
search was properly conducted pursuant to the objective criteria
set forth in Hygh, i.e., whether it is authorized by statute or
justified by the circumstances and whether it is conducted
pursuant to and in compliance with standarized procedures.

There

is no need to look at the subjective motivation of the police
officer because when an inventory search is properly conducted
pursuant to standarized procedures, the search is
constitutionally reasonable.
1221 (Utah App. 1993).

See State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217,

This rule is consistent with Hygh which

invalidated the inventory search because the police did not
follow the regularized set of procedures adopted by his
department.

Id. at 269-70.

The subjective intent of the officer

to search for evidence in Hygh. although alluded to by the Court,
was therefore unnecessary to the result reached.
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In this case, the objective, undisputed facts point to a
valid inventory search properly motivated by the underlying
purposes for doing an inventory search.

The defendant was

involved in an accident which resulted in her car being left at
the side of a road and in the custody of the police until it
could be moved.

Defendant does not dispute that the police in

this case followed their regularly established procedures and
filled out an inventory form and listed all items, both legal and
illegal, found in the car.

The officers even asked the towing

company they called after impounding the car to place the vehicle
in a secure area because of the possessions that remained inside.
All these factors support the trial court's ruling that this was
a valid inventory search.

The fact that Trooper Hancock also

subjectively had probable cause to search the car does not change
the validity of the inventory search.

See Harmon, 910 P.2d at

1206; Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1136-38.
Because the inventory search in this case was justified
under the circumstances and was conducted in compliance with the
applicable police policy, it was proper.
judgment on this point should be affirmed.
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The trial court's

POINT II
ALTERNATIVELY, THE OFFICER'S SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S CAR WAS
VALID BECAUSE HE HAD PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE CAR AND
THERE WERE EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
Although the trial court upheld the search of defendant's
car as a valid inventory search, the trial court's ruling may
also be sustained on the alternative basis that the officer had
probable cause to search the car and there were exigent
circumstances at the time the car was searched.

An appellate

court can uphold a trial court's ruling on any proper legal
basis.

State v. South, 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 5-6, 924 P.2d 354,

356 (Utah 1996); State v. Galleaos. 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah
1985) .
Under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution, a
warrantless search of an automobile must be justified by a
showing of both probable cause and exigent circumstances.
v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229, 1236-37 (Utah 1996).

State

Defendant

concedes that Trooper Hancock had probable cause to search her
car because he smelled burnt marijuana (App. Br. at 12, 14).
Defendant argues, however, that Trooper Hancock had to obtain a
warrant before searching the car because there were no exigent
circumstances.
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In Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court held that "exigent
circumstances exist when 'the car is movable, the occupants are
alerted, and the car's contents may never be found again if a
warrant must be obtained.'"

910 P.2d at 1237 (quoting State v.

Limb, 581 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978)(quoting Chambers v. Maroney.
90 S. Ct. 1975, 1981 (1970))),
In this case, exigent circumstances clearly existed at the
time Trooper Hancock conducted the inventory search.

A private

tow truck requested by defendant was en route to remove
defendant's car from the control of the police.
Morck. 821 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah App. 1991).

See State v.

There simply was

not time for Trooper Hancock to obtain a warrant before the tow
truck was to arrive and remove the car.

Once the car was removed

from the accident scene, the contraband that Trooper Hancock had
probable cause to believe was in the car could have been removed
and might never had been found again.

There was nothing to

prevent defendant and her passenger from going to pick the car up
later that day or to remove the contraband from the car or to
call someone to remove the contraband for them.

Id.

Because exigent circumstances were present at the time of
the search, the warrantless search of defendant's car was
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constitutionally reasonable.2
CONCLUSION
The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress
should be affirmed because the inventory search was justified
under the circumstances and conducted pursuant to written,
standarized policy and procedures.

In the alternative, the

search should be held valid because the officer had probable
cause and there were exigent circumstances at the time of the
search.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS *f% day of December, 1996.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

LAURA B. DUPAIX
Assistant Attorney General

2

Defendant suggests at the end of her brief that Trooper
Hancock should have been required to obtain a telephonic warrant.
The State is not required to show that the officers could not get
a telephonic warrant; it need only demonstrate that exigent
circumstances justified the search. State v. Morck. 821 P.2d
1190, 1194 (Utah App. 1991).
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The Supreme
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Supreme
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searches of vehicles; and that
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a warrant.
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warrantless
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that, in terms of the Utah Constitution,
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the federal
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to obtain
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reasonable
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search because

turned

over

company,
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driver
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ambulance
facts.
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call a tow truck, it did arrive and he conducted a
search of the vehicle.
Now, absent
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of marijuana
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search of the vehicle
MS. LACHMAR:
THE COURT:
contraband,
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inventory

legally?

I think
Why,
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or

so,

then, does
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the presence

of contraband,
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change
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scenario?
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search

in order
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to investigate

THE COURT:
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How do you know?
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in the case.
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an inventory
inventory
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criminal
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searches
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then is his right or obligation
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evidence
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M S . LACHMAR:

detecting
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But sequentially
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the odor of marijuana, burnt marijuana,

facts were before him and only

scenario unfold with respect
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to them being
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and

the

transported

to the hospital
it seems

and the vehicle
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arose, he needed
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to do with
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the car.
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that?
MS. LACHMAR:
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Fourth Amendment

rights
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who is involved
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their vehicle,

the hoops and obtain
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a warrant

suspect

that
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property,
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I need
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that the

State

this
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requi res.
I have
—

individuals

here whose property

the search of whose property

filing of criminal

charges.

State, or the police, obtain
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Otherwise, because

supposed
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We require
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the

a warrant

before

they do

an inventory

search

is

to be free of and not done for the purpose

investigating

criminal

conduct

part of it.

It is done merely

property

to protect
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at all.
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to protect
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accusations
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there is no requirement
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criminal
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suspect
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who is suspected

greater

rights

to obtain

for a warrant
investigating

the term

the rights

are

always present?

of criminal

Does
have

conduct

of

conduct?

the fact

because what

No.
that
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But it seems

is saying

been discovered
along and done

THE COURT:

If in fact

possible

criminality,

act in conjuntion

is f

there's
does

with

if he would

the inventory

search.

that's a

an awareness

that require

of a

an officer

that or can the officer

if there were no criminality,

to

act as

but upon other rights or

obligations, such as an inventory
of possible

case,

look, it would

any way
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concern.

to me that -- I

this is a difficult

the court

inevitably

presence

a warrant.

than someone who is not suspected

MS. LACHMAR:
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in
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the rights
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conduct.

THE COURT:
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criminality
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7

THE COURT:

Right.
Once
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14

is this scenario

15

may be some suspicion
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19

requirement
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to go ahead

Those

property

Pursuant
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inventory
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this accident
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is that he detects

At that point
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there was someone
scene.
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-- I mean,

to remove
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and
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vehicle?
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that

unless
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to that
concerns
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search?
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to me what you're

then he can't do it unless he gets

close

hadn't

--
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are not
of
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In other words,

Appendix B

GENERAL ORDER NO. 83-9
(Revised July 1991)
TO:

All Personnel

SUBJECT

flirt

«

Vehicles and contents:

m

Handling abandoned, stolen, seized, hold-for-evidence,
improperly registered vehicles. Vehicles in a hazardous
place or position, vehicles in an unsafe condition.
2.

Custodial care of such vehicles and contents.

PURPOSE
I.

To establish procedures to be used when discovering vehicles
as described in item one above and the proper care of such
vehicles.

2.

To establish procedures for custodial care of the contents
in, on or towed by any vehicle as described under subject,
item two.

AUTHORITY
Under the existing Utah statutes peace officers are
authorized to remove and/or cause to be removed vehicles
under the following conditions:
a.

When any vehicle is parked, stopped or standing on a
roadway, whether attended or unattended, where it was
practical to stop off the roadway*(U.C.A. 41-6-101).

b.

When any vehicle is illegally left standing on any
highway, bridge, causeway or tunnel where such vehicle
constitutes an obstruction to traffic (U.C.A.
41-6-102[b]).

c.

When an officer has indications that the vehicle had
been stol* or taken without the owner's consent
(U.C.A. 4 6-iOZ[c][I] and 41-1-115).

d.

When a vehicle on a roadway is so disabled as to be a
hazard to traffic and the person or persons in charge
of such vehicle are unable to provide for its custody
or removal (U.C.A. 41-6-102[2]).

e.

When the person driving or in control of such vehicle
is arrested for an alleged offense for which the
officer is required by law to take a person
immediately before a magistrate (U.C.A.
41-6-102[c][3]).

General Order No. 83-9
(Revised July 1991) Page 2 of 8
f.

When the vehicle is being operated with improper
registration (U.C.A. 41-1-115).

g.

When any manufacturer's mark or identification mark
has been altered, defaced or obliterated (U.C.A.
41-1-115).

h.

When a vehicle is found being driven on a highway in
unsafe mechanical condition (U.C.A. 41-6-157).

i.

When a vehicle has been left unattended on a highway
for more than 24 hours, it is presumed to be abandoned
(U.C.A. 41-6-116[10]).

j.

When a vehicle has been left unattended on other
public or private property for more than seven daysf
it is then presumed to be abandoned (U.C.A.
41-6-116[10j).

k.

When removal is necessary in the interest of public
safety because of fire, flood, storm, snow or other
emergency reasons or for the safety of the vehicle and
its contents.

DEFINITIONS
1.

Towed away: When a wrecker service removes the vehicle for
the purpose of storage or safekeeping.

2.

Impound; When a vehicle is being held for legal reasons and
the owner must fulfill certain legal requirements before he
regains possession.

3.

Hold-for-owner; When a vehicle has been removed at the
direction of an officer and the owner may regain possession
at his discretion by assuming obligations incurred for
towing and storage.

4.

Seized; When an officer takes custody of a vehicle which
has been used in transporting any contraband items and legal
ownership could be transferred to the State of Utah by
appropriate legal action.

5*

Hold-for-evidence; When an officer takes custody of a
vehicle and such vehicle is needed as evidence in any
pending criminal action.
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Urban area: For purposes of this policy, urban area shall
be defined as the following:
1-15 from the southern Utah County line to the
northern Weber County line. 1-80 from the west Summit
County line (Parley's Summit) to 7200 West in Salt
Lake County. All other highways within the above
described Wasatch Front area.
Rural area: All other highways within the State of Utah.
Road shoulder: A road shoulder is that portion of the road,
contiguous with the roadway (trafficway) for accommodation
of stopped vehicles, for emergency use and for lateral
support of the roadway structure. By definition, this will
include freeway emergency lanes.

When a vehicle is taken to any police parking lot, impound
lot or to any commercial storage lot, a case number shall be
assigned and a written inventory shall be made of the
contents of the vehicle, the trunk and any package,
container or compartment. Such record shall become a part
of the case file. When custody of the vehicle changes from
one person to another, the person taking custody of the
vehicle shall also assume custody of the contents by placing
his signature on the inventory list.
When a vehicle is removed on a hold-for.-owner basis,
immediate steps shall be taken to locate the owner and
inform him of the location of the vehicle and how he may
regain possession. If the owner cannot be located within 24
hours, the vehicle shall be impounded.
When a vehicle is impounded for improper registration,
stolen; abandoned or seized and impounded under provisions
of 41-6-44.30 (Driving Under the Influence), the officer
shall immediately complete a Utah State Tax Commission
impound report, place the Commission copy in the appropriate
envelope and mail to the State Tax Commission. After the
impound report has been mailed, the officer shall not
authorize the release of the vehicle without the express
consent of the State Tax Commission.
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When an officer takes custody of a vehicle for
hold-for-evidence, the officer shall cause a notice to be
placed on the vehicle stating that the vehicle is being held
as evidence and also inform the storage lot attendant of
this fact. The officer shall immediately inform the
prosecuting attorney. Such vehicle shall be released only
on approval of the prosecuting attorney or at the direction
of the court.
When a vehicle has been seized, the officer shall proceed in
accordance with current procedure and law.
a*

Department of Public Safety form DPS 100 (Seized
Vehicle Report Form) shall be completed and forwarded
to the Commissioner's Office through the chain of
command.

An entry shall be made in the officer's daily log recording
information as to location and disposition of all such
vehicles and a separate entry with the same information
shall become part of the case file.
Costs of towing and storage of vehicles shall be the
responsibility of the owner except for hold-forevidence and seized vehicles. In such cases financial
arrangements for storage charges should be made through the
prosecuting attorney.
All vehicle keys shall remain with the vehicle and shall be
surrendered to the owner or driver at the time the vehicle
is released.
BE USED
Physically arrested persons
a.

In the event the driver or person in control of a
vehicle is arrested and taken from the scene, the
vehicle shall be under the control of the arresting
officer and handled in the following manner:
1)

If permission is obtained from the owner or
driver and if other manpower is readily
available, the vehicle may be driven to the
impound lot, police parking lot or the owner's
residence, whichever is the most practical,
keeping in mind the safety of the vehicle and
its contents; or

20
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2)

The officer may have the vehicle towed away on a
hold-for-owner basis. The towing service will
then assume responsibility for the vehicle; or

3)

The vehicle may be released to a responsible
person designated by the arrestee after proper
identification of persons and vehicle has been
established.

4)

When the driver of a vehicle is arrested for
driving under the influence, the officer shall
comply with the provisions of 41-6-44.30 which
says:
a) If a category I Peace Officer arrests
or cites the driver of a vehicle for
violating 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.10.-..The
officer shall seize and impound the
vehicle except as provided under
subsection (2).
b) If a registered owner of the vehicle,
other than the driver, is present at the
time of the arrest, the officer may
release the vehicle to that registered
owner, but only if the registered owner:
(1)

Requests to remove the vehicle
from the scene;

(2)

Presents to the officer a
valid driver license and
sufficient identification to
prove ownership of vehicle;

(3)

Complies with all restrictions
of his driver license, and

(4)

Would not, in the judgment of
the officer, be in violation
of Section 41-6-44 or
41-6-44.10..., if permitted to
operate the vehicle and if the
vehicle itself is legally
operable.
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Stolen vehicle
a.

Determine if the vehicle is to be held for evidence by
contacting the police agency reporting the vehicle
stolen. If practical, act according to the request of
the reporting agency in determining disposition.

b.

If the vehicle is towed away or otherwise retained in
custody by the officer, it shall immediately be
impounded.

Vehicles parked on highway
a.

b.

Vehicles in traffic lane
1)

Have the person in charge immediately remove the
vehicle to the nearest place of safety. If
unable to do so, the vehicle may be immediately
towed away.

2)

Take appropriate enforcement action.

Vehicles on or adjacent to shoulder
1)

When an officer finds any vehicle parked on or
adjacent to the shoulder of any interstate
highway or any other highway which has a posted
speed of 55 m.p.h., he shall take immediate
steps to determine why the vehicle was parked at
that location and the approximate time of its
intended removal. If in the opinion of the
officer the position of the vehicle does not
constitute an obstruction of the normal movement
of traffic, the vehicle may be left for a
reasonable length of time not to exceed two
hours in urban areas and four hours in rural
areas. If in his opinion it does constitute an
obstruction to traffic, snow removal or highway
maintenance, he may immediately have the vehicle
towed away.

2)

Any vehicle not in violation of subsection 1)
above left unattended for a period in excess of
24 hours shall be presumed to have been
abandoned. After reasonable attempts to have
the owner remove the vehicle, and the owner
cannot or does not respond, the vehicle shall be
impounded.
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Vehicles parked on private property
a.

No officer shall remove or cause to be removed any
vehicle parked on private property unless such vehicle
has been found to have been stolen, abandoned or to be
used for evidentiary purposes. A vehicle is presumed
to be abandoned if left unattended on private property
without the express or implied consent of the owner
for a period in excess of seven days.

b.

In the event a vehicle is abandoned on private
property, an officer should impound the vehicle only
after having secured a signed request from the owner
or person in lawful control of such property on Utah
Highway Patrol Form HPF-5, "Request to Remove Vehicle
from Private Property." Such request shall become
part of the case file.

Vehicles on highway with improper registration
a.

b.

c.

Vehicle being operated with expired registration.
1)

Issue a uniform complaint and summons.

2)

Instruct the driver to remove the vehicle from
the highway until the proper registration is
obtained.

3)

If, in the officer's opinion, the violation is
flagrant, the vehicle should be impounded.

Vehicle being operated with no registration or with
registration issued for another person or vehicle.
1)

Issue a uniform complaint and summons.

2)

If, in the officer's opinion, the violation is
flagrant, the vehicle should be impounded; if it
is not impounded, follow a.2) above.

3)

If impounded, all improper plates and
certificate of registration shall be removed and
sent to the State Tax Commission with the
impound notice—if not to be used as evidence.

Vehicles parked with expired or no registration
displayed.
1)

After reasonable efforts have been made to have
owner remove the vehicle, handle in the same
manner as abandoned vehicles.
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6.

Vehicles being operated in unsafe mechanical condition.
a.

Take appropriate enforcement action.

b.

When, in the opinion of the officer, continued
operation would be unreasonable and excessively
dangerous, the officer may require the owner or
operator to remove the vehicle by means other than by
being driven. If the vehicle is towed away, it may be
taken to any location as directed by the owner or
operator (U.C.A. 41-6-157 [c]).

REVIEW
This order shall be reviewed before December 31, 1995.
Effective date March 1. 1989.
Colonel S. Duane Richens
Superintendent
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